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The economic performance of a country depends, among other things, on the strategies 
and structures of its firms. In the framework that is designed by institutions and policies 
and determined by technology and macroeconomic cycles, entrepreneurs decide how to 
allocate available resources in order to face off competitors and to hook up with demand 
cycles. 
This paper looks at the evolution of the Italian economy across the last 150 years from a 
business history perspective. Analyzing Italian firms over the long-term cycles of the 
global economy and with respect to the different paradigms of the three industrial 
revolutions, we identify some structural features that explain successes and failures of the 
Italian economy. In doing this we explicitly connect the micro level of the business 
enterprise to the macro one of the national business system and explain the comparatively 
good performance of the Italian economy from the end of the 19
th century to the 1970s. 
Over the last three decades this performance has turned negative, highlighting the role 
played by the small average size of firms and the failure of institutions to provide 
incentives for growth. 
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1.  Introduction
1 
The economic performance of a country depends, among other things, on the 
characteristics of and the strategies adopted by its firms. It is firms and their entrepreneurs 
that, given the macroeconomic environment, the institutions and the policies, choose how to 
face competitors and hook up with demand cycles, whether to adopt new technologies and 
innovate products and processes.   
This paper revisits the evolution of the Italian productive system in the last 150 years. 
Observing Italian firms over the various long-term cycles of the global economy and with 
respect to the different technological paradigms that have emerged throughout allow us to 
identify some structural features that may explain successes and failures of the Italian 
economy. Obviously, in doing so, we do not pretend to offer an exhaustive explanation, but 
to outline an interpretative framework built around the nature and the choices of firms and 
entrepreneurs. 
When talking about firms, in particular industrial firms as we do, globalization and 
technology are crucial and, surely in the case of Italy, exogenous factors: they shape the 
competitive environment, the comparative advantages, the level and the nature of market 
demand, the productivity (aggregate, sectoral and of firms). They are also strictly inter-
twined concepts: on one side, breakthrough technological advancements, especially in 
transportation and communication, has often given rise to globalization waves; on the other 
side, intensified international flows of goods, services, labor and capital have been key for 
the spreading of new technologies worldwide. Useless to say, technology plays a crucial role 
even when globalization retrenches. 
Three “technological revolutions” have to be considered over the history of united 
Italy. The first one, dating back to the end of the 18
th century, is identifiable with a bulk of 
technological innovations which evolved around the general purpose technology of the 
steam engine and boosted productivity in industries like textiles, metallurgy, and mining. 
The new technologies in transportation and communication originated by the first industrial 
revolution were the premise both for the first globalization wave (from the last decades of 
the 18
th century to 1913), but also for the advent of a second industrial revolution. Developed 
around the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the second industrial revolution is centered 
on the application of mass-production techniques (like the assembling line in the mechanical 
industry) and the diffusion of a general purpose form of energy like electricity: it invested 
industries like steel, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, refining, food processing. The third 
technological revolution brings us to the last 3-4 decades: based on physics, it is known as 
the new information and communication technology (ICT) and led to the emergence and 
diffusion of semiconductors, computer and software, biotechnologies with significant 
advances in many technology- and science-intensive industries (aerospace, pharmaceutical, 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to Maggie Dufresne who has translated and edited the paper, to Marco Chiurato for 
editorial assistance and for his help, along with Elena Genito, with the Assonime data, to Michelangelo Vasta 
who supported the consultation of Imita.db and to Giovanni Federico who kindly provided the census data. We 
also thank Alfredo Gigliobianco, Gianni Toniolo, Vera Zamagni and participants to the workshop “Italy’s 
International Economic Position, 1861-2011” held in Perugia (December 2010). The views expressed herein 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions they belong to. 
 
5etc.). Favored by these technological advancements that have reduced the “size of the 
world”, a second globalization wave has significantly changed the international competitive 
environment since the 1990s. 
In the next section, we set the stage of our analysis by describing the Italian industrial 
sector through the international cycles and the technological revolutions from 1861 to 2011. 
Anecdotal evidence and census data make clear that since 1890s Italian firms have been 
able, though with some delay with respect to the main advanced economies but before many 
others, to latch to the first two technological revolutions, to take advantage of the first 
globalization and, in the period between the two world wars, to surf through the autarchic 
policies and the protectionist attitudes which spread almost everywhere in Europe. In the 
“golden age” period, the high growth rates of the Italian economy were accompanied by a 
robust development of the productive system around big privately-owned and State-owned 
firms. Overall, it is not too far from truth claiming that the Italian industrial sector performed 
comparatively well from the end of the 19
th century until 1970.  
These developments have turned negative in the last (and recent) technological 
revolution and globalization episode. Despite Italy was in the 1960s in the same position as 
many other advanced nations to grasp the opportunities offered by ICT, this did not happen; 
indicators of diffusion of ICT in Italy signal a delay in adoption during the 1990s and still a 
significant distance from the technological frontier. At the same time, and especially since 
the mid-90s, Italian firms have suffered relatively more than European rivals the increased 
competitive pressures from low-cost goods and services produced in emerging and 
developing countries (Brandolini and Bugamelli 2009).   
There are obviously many causes – political and economic, macro and microeconomic, 
domestic and international – behind such a turnaround in Italy’s (absolute and relative) 
economic performance, but if we have to isolate one important structural feature of the 
Italian productive system this is firm size. The size of a firm is indeed positively correlated 
with innovation, internationalization, adoption of advanced technologies, ability to face new 
competitive challenges; through all these channels, larger firms record higher productivity, 
surely levels, often growth rates.  
There are good theoretical reasons for larger firms to be better equipped along those 
dimensions, ranging from a greater availability of financial resources to a less risk-averse 
approach, from a greater capacity to attract high-skilled workers to the adoption of more 
efficient and innovative organizational and managerial practices. In Section 3 we will 
provide support to these hypotheses using the results of empirical analyses conducted solely 
on recent data; however, we believe – and anecdotal evidence confirms it – that the profound 
characteristics that make a firm to be catching up with the technological frontier and 
successful in the global economy are invariantly the same across modern times. 
To accept firm size as a credible explanatory factor of Italy’s economic performance 
since its unification, we need to show that the distribution of firms in terms of their 
dimension was somehow adequate until the 1970s, but defective later on. This is the object 
of Section 4.  
Firm size is not a given, however. It is instead the endogenous choice of entrepreneurs. 
This calls for a look at the background, the characteristics, the strategies of those people that 
have founded and run Italian firms over the last 150 years. In Section 5 we review the stories 
 
6of the most relevant entrepreneurs and managers (of both privately- and State-owned 
enterprises), trying to identify the main features of Italian entrepreneurship. We will linger 
not only on single well-known individuals, but also on the mass of anonymous small and 
medium family entrepreneurs that gave rise to the industrial districts and the so called 
“quarto capitalismo”.  
The last step that we leave to our concluding remarks is to provide answers to the 
following crucial questions: what are the main causes behind the failure of large firms 
(private and public) and the large predominance of small and medium enterprises? How 
much does it have to do with deep-rooted attitudes and the dominant entrepreneurial culture 
in Italy? What has been the role of the State? Finally, and more importantly, what should 
policy-makers do now to address these structural weaknesses? 
2.  Italy between globalization waves and industrial revolutions 
1861 –1914  
At the eve of its political unification, the Peninsula was already deeply embedded in 
the international economy. The small States which composed the variegated geographical 
patchwork of the future Kingdom of Italy were involved, to a different extent and in different 
ways, in the international flows of trade and investments which were at the basis of the 
expansionary cycle of the first globalization. The largest, and more dynamic regional-States 
(the Kingdom of Sardinia, but mostly Piedmont), the Kingdom of Lombardy and the 
Venetian region – in the North – and the Kingdom of two Sicilies in the South were already 
in close contact with the fast-growing economies of Central Europe, namely Britain, 
Belgium, Germany, and France. This involvement had two key features.  
First, while Italian states were participating to international markets of goods, no or 
little integration was at work among the regional economies of the Peninsula (Cafagna 
1989). Southern wines, citrus, olive oil, sulfur and other minerals were shipped (mostly by 
British and French merchants) to British and French ports as raw materials for the domestic 
manufacturing industry. The North was delivering Piedmont’s foodstuffs and wool or 
enormous quantities of raw silk produced in the hilly pre-alpine area going from Piedmont to 
Venice in France and Germany, where this “staple” product was sent to factories and 
transformed into weaved silk (Federico 1994). But very scarce were the flows of the same 
goods among the Italian regions, mostly due to the poor endowment of internal 
transportation networks. Secondly, Italy’s competitive advantages were basically in 
agriculture. Peasantry and farming pervaded all the regions, even if with large 
heterogeneities in terms of productivity, resource endowment, technological dynamism and 
innovation. The most “industrial” product, that is raw silk, was coming from the countryside, 
produced by farmers who grew up silk worms to support the household’s income.  
Before and immediately after its political unification Italy had a clear and defined role 
in the international division of labor, basically as a provider of agricultural products and raw 
materials
2. The pervasiveness of agriculture imprinted not only the way in which Italy 
entered and was part of the first globalization wave, but also the way in which the first 
                                                 
2 This was well understood by the ruling class which, especially in the Northern areas, orientated both trade and 
infrastructural policies so as to improve the efficiency of the communication networks with central and 
northern Europe and make the Italian countryside closer and closer to the Continental markets. 
 
7industrial revolution impacted on the economy of the newborn State. As in the rest of 
Continental Europe, the first industrial revolution transformed the manufacturing activities 
already in place, but in Italy this happened with a clear adaption to the national economic 
conditions.  
Until the last two decades of the nineteenth century, manufacturing activities remained 
in Italy marginal in terms of contribution to GDP and rudimental in their structure, so 
rudimental that the few exceptions (like the woolen modern plant of Alessandro Rossi in 
Schio, near Vicenza) were considered as unique wonders to admire. Manufacturing was 
mainly based upon putting-out and small workshops, while clusters of small plants and mills 
agglomerated in the bottom of the valleys in search of the cheapest form of energy: water. 
These manufacturing activities were, often, the follow-up of craft and guild traditions, 
especially in urban centers as Milan, Turin or Naples or the heritage of artisanal know-how 
in specialized areas which were going to be labeled, after one century, “industrial districts”.  
On one hand, the pre-industrial heritage existing in many areas of the country – in 
which artisanal know-how, domestic production, putting-out networks and mercantile 
traditions mixed up – was a promising seedbed for the new production techniques, also 
thanks to the presence of a pervasive apparatus of technical schools and professional 
institutes. On the other hand, though, it was barely impossible to separate – as in Britain and 
Germany – the manufacturing activities from agriculture: during this early phase of 
industrialization the main (in terms of production and employment) manufacturing industries 
like textiles – basically silk, wool and cotton –, metallurgy, food processing and non-organic 
chemical fertilizers had strong and strict linkages with agriculture. The countryside was, in 
fact, both the source of raw materials and labor force as well as the main market for the 
products of small mills and craft shops
3.  
The low degree of competitiveness and technological advancement of domestic 
challengers, if any, and a promising, even though still uncertain, domestic market made easy 
and convenient for foreign entrepreneurs to invest in the Peninsula, before and after the 
Unification. In cotton, already before the unification, Swiss entrepreneurs were establishing 
factories both in the North (Lombardy) and in the South (near Naples), enjoying a cheap and 
disciplined labor force. In mechanics and metallurgy German, French and British initiatives 
could be found in the main cities, where public procurement offered good opportunities. 
Foreign capital, and with it expertise, technology and know-how, were flowing into the 
Peninsula thanks to the presence of free-standing companies, mainly Belgian and French, 
that from their home-country based headquarters invested capitals gathered in the domestic 
                                                 
3 For example, in the metalworking districts in the pre-alpine regions (Como Lake, Bergamo and Brescia) the 
prevalent production pattern was based upon the recycling of scrap iron to be transformed into finished wares 
for agriculture. As a result, the production cycle could be fragmented and carried on in small, specialized 
production units (Colli, 2002). This was even more diffused in textiles: in Biella (Piedmont) the production of 
semi-finished and finished woolen fabrics, exported everywhere in Europe, was carried on in-house, by artisans 
who were also peasants, while some phases of the production process (dyeing, for instance) were increasingly 
centralized into mechanized plants (Ramella 1983). Cotton was not an exception: domestic production in 
peasants’ houses and putting-out system dominated alongside rare factories which gathered only few dozens of 
workers. In the Altomilanese (a countryside area north-west Milan) entrepreneurial merchants started to invest 
into spinning plants, at the same time relying on the domestic efforts of thousands of half-peasants-half-
laborers. Entrepreneurial families like Cantoni, Crespi and Dell’Acqua employed officially thousands of 
laborers, of which only a few dozen under one roof and the rest working at home (Romano 1992). 
 
8stock exchanges in mining, or, more frequently, in utilities as waterworks and gas networks, 
or local transports as tramways or local railways, without exceptions from Lombardy to 
Sicily (Hertner 1998).    
Thus, the first industrial revolution initially had not an impact incisive enough to 
transform in depth the dominant patterns in the economy of a peripheral country which had 
been unified on the basis of moral, cultural, ideal and political issues more than that of real 
economic needs. However, up to the 1880s, a “first coat of industrial paint” has been given 
(Cafagna 1989), thanks sometimes to the initiatives of the State which had to build quickly 
some necessary infrastructures as, for instance, an efficient network of railways on a national 
and not regional scale, or to become more independent from abroad for military products
4. 
The technologies, industries and products of the first industrial revolution thus slowly 
diffused flourishing on the seedbed of local craft and mercantile traditions, until the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, when something new happened.     
The first globalization wave had in fact not only the shape of international trade for 
Italian agricultural products or the inflow of foreign capital in infrastructures and services. 
Progressively, the challenges posed by the inflows into European continental markets of 
cheap products from the Russian large estates and the US mid-west became serious for 
Italian producers, pushing them to ask for higher trade barriers. The protectionist reaction, 
extended to manufacturing, provided the basis for more frequent and ambitious 
entrepreneurial initiatives in traditional and more “modern” industries. 
Since the beginning of the 1890s the rate of growth of manufacturing accelerated at a 
pace never seen before. Some industries – namely mechanics, metallurgy, steam engines, 
electricity and electro-mechanics – experienced a double digit rate of expansion during the 
whole period known as the “Giolittian Age”, after Italy’s Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti 
(Zamagni 1978; Toniolo 1988). In this phase some “first movers” established an enduring 
advantage in some industries of the second industrial revolution through a strategy of 
investments and growth (Amatori and Colli 1999). Electricity (mainly, in the form of 
hydroelectricity) and the electro-mechanic industry were already present in a quite 
sophisticated form since the beginning of the 1890s. But also FIAT’s automobiles, Pirelli’s 
rubber, Ansaldo’s shipbuilding, and Falck, Piombino and Terni in mass- production of 
steel
5. Again, a large part of this modernization was due to the globalization: foreign 
investments carried with themselves the most advanced tec
6 hnologies . 
                                                
This expansion created a number of bottlenecks and imbalances that could be solved 
thanks again to the dynamics of the first globalization. To feed this fast modernization 
process, at an initial stage Italy needed to import technology under the form of machinery 
and plants from abroad, and energy (mainly coal). This created obviously a growing trade 
 
4 In metallurgy, military procurement was at the origin of the establishment of the Terni’s iron and steel works, 
the first attempt to modernize steel production (Bonelli, 1975). 
5 The geographical concentration of new “modern” plants in some areas in the North of the country (in 1911 
Milan, Turin and Genoa produced 55 per cent of the country’s industrial value added) accentuated the 
economic divide between the Northern and Southern regions. 
6 German and Swiss investments flew into the Peninsula in the electric and electro-mechanic industry, where 
AEG and Siemens dominated together with the American Westinghouse and the Swiss Brown Boveri; in 1906 
Mannesmann started a joint venture with an Italian partner, Orlando, for producing in Dalmine, near Bergamo, 
steel pipes with a sophisticated technology. 
 
9deficit partly counterbalanced by the large amount of remittances from Italian emigrants 
(Cafagna 1989). 
At the eve of the WWI and around fifty years after its unification, Italy could 
undoubtedly be considered as one of the advanced European nations, and for sure the sole in 
the Mediterranean to have undertaken a process of industrial modernization. The census data 
for 1911 confirm that the sectors of the first industrial revolution (foodstuffs and tobacco, 
textiles, clothing, leather goods, wood and furniture, paper, metallurgy) were absorbing more 
than three-quarters of manufacturing employees, a larger share of it in textiles and foodstuffs 
(Table 1). Among the sectors that we include in the second industrial revolution (publishing, 
energy, chemicals, rubber and plastic, glass, cement and bricks, steel and metallurgy, 
mechanical instruments, automotives and other transportation equipment), in 1911 a relative 
higher weight characterized glass, cement and bricks, steel (and metallurgy) and other (than 
automobiles) forms of transportation equipment. 
However, two weaknesses were still limiting Italy’s development. The still dominant 
and pervasive primary sector, characterized by diffused self-production and low income 
levels, made internal demand limited and slow-growing, thus restraining industrial 
development
7. Secondly, in Italy the signs of the second industrial revolution, diffused 
quickly on the wings of the first globalization in other advanced economies (with US and 
Germany surpassing Britain), were still quite weak: according to some estimates, in 1911 the 
total value of steel production was almost equal to that of manufactured silk.  
1915 – 1970  
Ironically, the event that brought to an end the first globalization was at the same time 
at the edge of the definitive Italian industrial modernization. WWI very quickly consolidated 
existing leaders fueling their expansion, and providing new occasions for growth. Three 
examples are particularly significant. In the hydroelectric industry, the war allowed 
companies to complete their capital intensive investments very quickly (and at a low cost 
thanks to the growing inflation), to provide energy working at their full capacity, and to 
accumulate know-how and competencies in a way typical of a truly “modern” industry. In 
chemicals the conflict provided Montecatini, a mining company, the resources for an 
ambitious expansion strategy of downward integration. Revenues and profits from the war 
allowed Fiat to inaugurate in 1923 the Lingotto, Europe’s largest automobile plant endowed 
with the most advanced techniques. Similar dynamics could be found in other industries in 
which the technologies of the second industrial revolution could deploy their potential, for 
instance in artificial fibers where in the 1920s SNIA quickly became a European leader and a 
member of a powerful international cartel.  
As said above, the outbreak of the war coincided with the end of the first globalization 
wave, a situation which was worsened by the Great Depression followed by autarchic 
policies and protectionist attitudes which spread almost everywhere in Europe. On the one 
side, the protection which the Fascist regime granted to domestic companies allowed them to 
further consolidate on the internal market: Montecatini and Fiat, for instance, could easily 
maintain their position as undisputed leaders, respectively in fertilizers and automotives. On 
the other side, though, it revealed itself as a sort of iron cage. Italian companies in the large-
                                                 
7 At the beginning of the 1920s, if Italian per capita income was “1”, in the United Kingdom or France it was 
“2” while that of a US citizen was almost four times as much (Fuà 1981). 
 
10scale, capital-intensive industries of the second industrial revolution were facing a small and 
relatively stagnating domestic market, nothing comparable to the continental-size one which 
US firms could enjoy, or the captive Southern-European one which German companies had 
at their disposal before the war. Contrary to the pre-WWI period, Italian firms did not benefit 
from international exposure, now precluded by the worldwide economic depression and 
autarchic closures.  
This situation affected the Italian approach to the second industrial revolution in two 
ways. First of all, due to the small internal market it was not possible for domestic large 
firms to fully exploit the benefits of mass production. Second, sticking on the internal market 
meant also to adapt production and diversification strategies to the existing demand: 
Montecatini basically maintained the production of fertilizers as its core activity, with 
limited diversification in advanced chemicals, for which it had necessarily to buy German 
technology and expertise. Last but not least, entrepreneurial limits affected the full 
modernization of the iron and steel industry (see section 5), which remained characterized by 
excess capacity and production overlaps, and above all by the absence of modern plants able 
to carry on an integrated production process
8.  
To sum up, in the interwar period, which is a phase of retrenching globalization, Italy 
approached almost all the industries of the second industrial revolution. The limits of the 
internal market in terms of dimension and dynamics, together with the monopolistic attitudes 
of entrepreneurs shared by the Fascist government, heavily affected the Italian approach to 
the new technological shift. 
A confirmation, if needed, of this explanation is provided by the changes occurred 
after the Second World War, when many of the above mentioned constraints were removed 
by a number of new conditions. During the twenty five years immediately following the war, 
the Italian economy enjoyed extremely high rates of growth, both in GDP and manufacturing 
output, comparable only to those of the first decade of the Twentieth century. Four element, 
two endogenous and two exogenous, contributed to boost (but were also the consequences 
of) what is rightly defined as the “Economic Miracle”. Endogenous was the steady rise of 
internal demand accompanied by the social transformations that were at the basis of the 
definitive advent of a consumerist society; and endogenous was, since the beginning of the 
1950s, the modernization effort of State-owned enterprises in capital intensive industries to 
provide basic goods and infrastructures as motorways and an efficient telecommunication 
system. Crucial proved to be, however, two exogenous forces, both connected to the postwar 
attempts to restore a global economy: the first was the process of European integration, 
which, together with the above mentioned rise in internal demand, removed the handicap of 
the small and static domestic market. The second was the flow of international direct 
investments that filled technological gaps in some industries. 
At the beginning of the 1960s the second industrial revolution was in full swing. A 
large share of manufacturing employment was concentrated in the capital intensive 
industries like oil refining, automotives, chemicals, rubber, heavy mechanics, cement, steel 
and shipbuilding. Taking the sectors of the second industrial revolution as a whole, their 
share over the total number of manufacturing employees moved less than 40 per cent in the 
                                                 
8 Oil refining, one of the symbols of the second industrial revolution, was totally dominated by US companies, 
which controlled on-site plants transforming oil imported from the middle-East for a still limited internal 
demand. 
 
11interwar period to 52 per cent in 1961, and almost 60 per cent in 1971. In these sectors a 
major role was played by big businesses: the aggregate sales of the top-200 companies 
weighted around one-third of the Italian GDP – a percentage similar to that of US, Germany 
or Britain (Battilossi 1999). However, significant backwardness persisted in organizational 
and ownership structures of these large firms (Pavan 1977). On these issues we will come 
back in sections 4 and 5. 
In 1970 the effects of Italy’s catching-up were visible under many points of view, 
ranging from the general modernization of the society to the diffusion of consumption habits 
and styles proper of an advanced economy. Perhaps the best indicator is provided by the 
convergence of income levels towards US standards: Italian GDP per capita was the 36.6 per 
cent of US in 1950, 52.2 in 1960 e 64.6 in 1970, reaching 70 per cent the following decade. 
1970 – 2011 
Italian per capita income levels, however, started again to diverge from those of US 
after the 1980s. In 2000 GDP per capita was back at 66 per cent of that of US, in 2010, at 
63.8 per cent, was below the 1970 level. In order to explain this sudden reversal, it is worth 
turning once again at the relationship among technology, globalization and the domestic 
market.  
Since the 1960s, a new technological wave deeply transformed some industries and 
created new ones. The origins of the third industrial revolution are to be found in new 
technologies developed during WWII; their progressive maturation led to the emergence of 
the semiconductor industry, to the mass production of computers and the development of 
software, to the invention of new materials and the birth of the aerospace industry, to an 
acceleration in the technological development of pharmaceuticals first and biotechnologies 
after, and to the exploitation of the potentials of nuclear energy. Basically, the third 
industrial revolution was based on physics and a close interaction among public and private 
institutions providing the necessary research infrastructures and human capital. Frequently, it 
was big, established firms to diversify into these new activities given the necessity of huge 
investments to develop research in these technology- and science-intensive industries 
(Amatori and Colli 2011).   
The United States benefitted most from the so called new information and 
communication technologies (ICT): since the mid-1990s output and labor productivity 
growth in the US have been much higher than in the past and far in excess of that recorded in 
the main European countries. This acceleration has been ascribed largely to the introduction 
of ICT (Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000; Oliner and Sichel 2000; OECD 2003; Visco 2004). 
According to Timmer and van Ark (2005) the channels through which ICT affects 
productivity and value added are three. Firstly, the rapid progress in the production of ICT 
generates a sharp acceleration of productivity in the producing sectors whose contribution to 
aggregate productivity depends on the relevance of ICT producers. Secondly, the progressive 
reduction in the prices of ICT goods and the improvement in their quality hasten their 
adoption by firms, and therefore investment in ICT capital sustains labor productivity; 
moreover, since the use of more sophisticated machinery requires higher-skilled labor, 
increases in the level of human capital gives a further contribution to productivity growth. 
Thirdly, ICT stimulates innovation: to exploit the possibilities offered by a general purpose 
technology like ICT firms are stimulated to adopt more efficient forms of organization, thus 
improving total factor productivity (David 1990; Basu and Fernald 2008). Triplett and 
 
12Bosworth (2004) argue that the first two factors were the main drivers of the extraordinary 
economic growth of the United States in the late 1990s; the third factor began to produce 
effects only later and especially in the service sector. 
Well, if not optimally, placed in terms of its endowment in capital and scale intensive 
industries of the second industrial revolution, Italy was, back in the 1960s, in the same 
position as many advanced nations in order to grasp the opportunities offered by the third 
technological wave. And, actually, in some industries it seemed so: Italy had both 
entrepreneurial attitudes (see section 5) and the commitment and resources of large 
organizations to join the new technological wave. Both private and State-owned enterprises 
crossed the technological frontier quite early (i.e., at the beginning of the 1960s), for instance 
in electronics (Olivetti microcomputers) and microelectronics (SGS Ates and Microlambda 
semiconductors, controlled by the State), in nuclear energy, in telecommunications (Alenia 
and Telespazio, both State-owned). The network-based nature of the high-tech industries 
made essential the establishment of joint-ventures in applied research among companies, and 
this involved both State-owned and private groups as well as foreign multinationals 
(Bussolati, Malerba and Torrisi 1996). 
Only a few of those initiatives survived (e.g., semiconductors), but in a marginal – and 
protected by military procurement – position. Many (computer production or nuclear energy) 
had come to an end, while in others no attempts were made at all (notably, in biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals, where Italy suffered a chronic dependence from foreign capitals and 
knowledge).  
As a result, the Italian manufacturing industry entered the new globalization wave 
lacking of capabilities, investments and entrepreneurship in the high-tech industries of the 
third revolution and sticking on the capital intensive, mass production industries of the 
second industrial revolution, that however did not go through a full restructuring after the 
crisis of the 1970s, especially as far as the large section of State-owned enterprises is 
concerned.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, Italy was clearly lagging behind in terms of presence in 
ICT industries (Rossi 2003), as witnessed by the constant deficits in its technological trade 
balance. This is clearly visible in Table 1: the share of employees in the manufacturing 
sectors mostlyffected by ICT (office machinery, electrical devices, radios and televisions, 
and precision instruments) has, over the past three decades, remained stable around 7 per 
cent, a very low level in an international comparison. A more accurate sectoral breakdown, 
that looks within ICT sectors and includes among them also some productions of the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industry and of air transportation, would reinforce this 
outcome, showing how Italy concentrated its production efforts in the less technologically 
advanced areas.  
The picture does not improve when we consider the adoption of ICT across the whole 
economy. According to the estimates by Bugamelli and Pagano (2004), in 1997 Italian 
manufacturing enterprises trailed US ones in the adoption of ICT by an average of around 
seven years. This technological gap has been partly bridged during the last decade. In 
January 2010, the diffusion of “basic” ICT (computers, e-mail and Internet connections) 
approached saturation levels, with computerized enterprises accounting for over 90 per cent 
of the total, irrespective of their size or location (Istat 2010). In the meantime, though, the 
technological frontier has advanced, and despite the increasingly widespread diffusion of 
 
13basic ICT, Italy continues to be lagging behind. One example is broadband, whose 
penetration rate and average actual bandwidth are low in comparative terms (Ciapanna and 
Sabbatini 2008). Among Italian firms the use of Internet is limited to tasks with a low 
interactive content, such as access to on-line banking and to services provided on-line by the 
Public Administration, while the continued low diffusion of e-commerce strongly 
discourages individual enterprises from using this technology (Banca d’Italia 2010). 
Undoubtedly, the strong delay in the diffusion of ICT technologies, that in the next 
sections we will relate to an industrial structure dominated by small and medium enterprises 
with too few large firms, have constrained demand for ICT as well as the advantages in 
developing innovative entrepreneurial activities in the IT sector. 
The ICT revolution has anticipated, partly caused, the second globalization wave. With 
varying degrees of intensity, in the last two decades it has affected product markets, the 
organization of production, labor and financial markets. The factors contributing to these 
developments have been the reduction in the barriers to the movements of goods and capital
9 
and the political changes and economic reforms in the former Communist countries, China, 
India and other emerging economies. International trade in goods and services has grown 
faster than world demand. Between 1987 and 2007, before the trade collapse recorded during 
the recent international crisis, the ratio of exports to world GDP rose from 18 to 31 per cent 
(that of goods from 14 to 25 per cent of GDP), mostly due to the emerging and developing 
countries whose share of world exports of goods rose from 21 to 37 per cent. 
The greater worldwide integration of goods markets has profoundly altered the 
structure of comparative advantages: by a rough estimate, due to the entry into the trade 
system of a sizable group of countries, such as China, India and the former Communist 
countries, endowed with an abundant supply of labor but a limited stock of capital, the labor 
force of the global market economy has been doubled (Freeman 2006). According to factor 
proportions theory, this should determine greater competition for labor-intensive industries, 
particularly those using unskilled labor. This is undoubtedly the case of Italy, whose 
specialization remains exceptionally unbalanced toward traditional sectors like textiles, 
clothing and footwear (Table 1). As a result of increased competitive pressures from low 
wage countries and China in particular, these sectors recorded the largest drop in 
employment (Federico 2010) and firms’ prices and profits (Bugamelli, Fabiani and Sette 
2011).  
The performance of Italian exports has sounded the first alarm bell about the existence 
of a structural problem in the competitiveness of the production system overall. Since the 
mid-1990s, the share of Italian exports on the world market for goods has tended to decline, 
and it did so until 2007. While recognizing that a similar trend was common to all the 
leading advanced countries, reflecting the entry into world markets of businesses located in 
the emerging economies, Italy’s market share has fallen often more than that of the main 
European economies, Germany above all. After the 2008-09 international crisis, this 
negative trend appears to be continuing. 
                                                 
9 Both in multinational venues (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, subsequently, the World 
Trade Organization) and within regional blocs such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement 
 
14Over the past several decades globalization has involved not only the integration of 
markets but also the reorganization of production on an international basis
10. This has 
resulted in a rapid expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI): its stock has grown from 7 
per cent of world GDP at the end of 1980s to 29 in 2007
11. Also in terms of outward FDI 
Italy is lagging behind the other main European countries: according to Eurostat data, in 
2007 the stock of outward FDI amounted to 23 per cent of GDP in Italy, against 35 per cent 
in Germany, 38.1 per cent in Spain and 52.5 per cent in France. 
During the last globalization and technological wave, the backbone of the Italian 
productive system has been a large mass of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), also for 
the progressive disappearance of larger firms in strategic sectors. Often organized within 
industrial districts, where they could exploit agglomeration externalities, these SMEs have 
guaranteed, back in the 1970s and 1980s, employment, exports and, in more general, a 
significant dynamism to the Italian economy. Since the mid-1990s, however, they also 
entered a difficult phase that has coincided with the prolonged, very unsatisfactory growth 
performance of Italy, the one that still plagues it in 2011. 
3.  A role for firm size? 
In the previous section we have reminded here and there how big businesses have 
often been the main actors of Italy’s industrial development and how the slow growth of the 
last decades is accompanied with a productive system dominated by small and medium 
enterprises. Now we want to give more substance to our thesis that firm size affects a 
country’s competitiveness and growth. 
 Providing evidence in support of these claims along the 150 years of Italy’s 
unification is not possible. The lack of detailed firm-level data for the less recent years to be 
combined with equally detailed measures of firm- or sector-level performance is an 
insurmountable obstacle to conduct reliable empirical exercises for the whole period under 
analysis.   However, data referred to the last 20-30 years come to help, especially if we 
accept, as we do, the hypothesis that the profound characteristics that crucially make a firm 
to be close to the technological frontier and successful in the global economy are invariantly 
the same across modern times.  
Therefore we first provide a survey of the recent empirical literature that relates firms’ 
characteristics to indicators of performance and conclude that there is a positive correlation 
between firm size on one side and innovation, internationalization and productivity on the 
other. Then, we use census data on the Italian manufacturing sector and firm-level data on 
the main Italian firms, both available since few years before WWI, to argue that changes in 
the distribution of firm size can contribute to explain successes and failures of the Italian 
economy in the different international cycles.  
                                                 
10 Thanks to lower transport and communication costs, many firms have located phases of production in 
different countries, on the basis of the relative costs of factors (Feenstra 1998). In addition, there has been 
increasing recourse to cross-border mergers and acquisitions for the purpose of penetrating foreign markets or 
achieving economies of scale. The internationalization of production permits firms to access new technologies, 
knowledge or specialized skills and thereby raise their productivity. 
11 In this context, the role of multinational companies has become ever more important: their foreign affiliates 
are estimated to account for some 10 per cent of world GDP and a third of world exports (Unctad 2007). 
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3.1  Firm size, innovation and technology adoption 
Recent data on R&D, patents and the realization of product and process innovations all 
consistently signal that Italy lags behind with respect to the other main advanced economies. 
In 2008, R&D expenditure in Italy amounted to 1.2 per cent of GDP, below the EU average 
(1.8) and very far from Germany (2.6) and Scandinavian countries; the gap is almost entirely 
due to the private component that is to the contribution of firms. According to the data of the 
European Patent Office, in 2001 Italy’s share, equal to 7.8 per cent, is smaller than that of 
the main European countries; the number of patents per capita poses Italy among the 
countries with a low propensity to patenting (along with Belgium, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal)
12.  
The lower level of innovative activity in Italy is surely affected by the bias of sector 
specialization towards traditional low-tech goods. However, this turns out not to be the main 
driving factor, since the Italian gap is significant also within each productive sector 
(Bugamelli, Cannari, Lotti and Magri 2011). According to Eurostat’s Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) data, in 2008 in all main European countries the share of innovative firms 
increases with firm size: in Italy it goes from 37 per cent among firms with 10-49 
employees, to 58 among firms with 50-249 employees, to 74 for larger firms. Along the 
same line, the share of firms with positive R&D goes from 13.8 per cent among the smaller 
firms to 50.7 among firms with more than 250 employees
13. Marini e Menon (2011) show 
how patenting is, in Italy, highly concentrated in few very large firms: over all the patents 
filed at the EPO by Italians between 1990 and 2007, almost a quarter is due to the 20 largest 
applicants, 40 per cent by firms with a turnover larger than 10 millions of euro
14.  At the 
macro-level it is widely acknowledged that innovation has a direct impact on firms’ 
productivity that in turn affects the rate of growth of a country. Pagano and Schivardi (2003) 
highlights the role of firm-size as a potential channel: they find that in those countries where 
average firm size is smaller, after controlling for sectoral differences, the growth rate of 
labor productivity is lower because of the greater difficulties by smaller firms to pay for the 
high fixed costs related to innovation and R&D activities
15.  
As pointed out in the previous section, Italy has always been lagging behind in the 
adoption of ICT. According to Bugamelli and Pagano (2004), the delay as of 1997 was not 
so much due to a production specialization skewed toward more traditional sectors (which 
                                                 
12 If one considers the propensity to realize any product or process innovation, the Italian delay reduces slightly, 
but these “extra innovators” appear to realize innovations that are characterized by a shorter innovative leap 
(Bugamelli, Cannari, Lotti and Magri 2011). 
13 Also the chances that a firm establishes a R&D collaboration with a University or public research entities 
increases significantly with firm size. 
14 Lotti e Schivardi (2005) find that the likelihood of filing a patent is positively correlated to the size of the 
firm, but for enterprises with at least one patent the relationship between size and number of patents is U-
shaped, with a minimum probability towards the thirtieth percentile of the firms’ size distribution, which 
corresponds to around 48 workers. The patent deficit in Italy, where small-sized enterprises are dominant, is 
therefore largely ascribable to the extensive margin (i.e., the low number of enterprises that file a patent). 
15 Taking into account the informal R&D activity of innovative SMEs, Hall, Lotti e Mairesse (2009) confirm 
the positive relationship between firm size and innovation. 
 
16tend to invest less in ICT) as much as to the scarcity of qualified workers and the high costs 
associated with implementation, especially as regards reorganizing business activities 
(Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002; Black and Lynch 2001 and 2004). Fabiani, 
Schivardi and Trento (2005) came to similar conclusions when they examined firm-level 
data for 2001, noting that the size of a firm as well as the availability of qualified personnel 
were determining factors in the decision to adopt ICT. Local presence of big businesses also 
tended to have a favorable impact on the likelihood of ICT investments, possibly because 
coordination between firms, favored by the presence of a “big player”, can help overcome 
investment hesitations during a changing phase of the technological paradigm. 
Why a productive system based primarily on small and medium sized firms is not able 
to stay abreast of the uses of ICT has reasons that are varied and interconnected. Given their 
specificity, these technologies are capable of changing a firm’s internal organization. 
Empirical studies focusing on US (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002; Black and Lynch 
2001) and Italy (Bugamelli e Pagano 2004) show how production gains were superior for 
those firms that adopted ICT and, at the same time, changed their internal organizations, 
reducing the number of hierarchy levels and moving toward more horizontal structures. This 
would suggest that the potential for organizational improvements is higher in more 
organizationally complex firms that, thanks to ICT, can efficiently reduce their scale. 
Furthermore, reorganization (both internal and external, that is with respect to suppliers and 
customers) calls for codifying and standardizing business activities, i.e., data and 
information that can be elaborated by a computer. It is again large sized firms that typically 
have a high level of standardization to start with. Smaller firms, instead, can still count on 
the use of “informal” exchanges rather than standardized procedures
16.  
Adoption costs also merit some consideration; they include both those related to 
reorganizing as well as to workforce training. Because new technologies typically leads to a 
major conversion of workers, those firms with a higher qualified workforce are more likely 
to adopt them. Often there is a positive correlation between the size of a firm and the quality 
of its workforce (Bugamelli, Cannari, Lotti and Magri 2011); moreover, when financial 
markets work imperfectly, small firms encounter greater difficulties in financing the high 
costs of new technologies’ adoption. 
3.2  Firm size and globalization 
Export flows are an important indicator of an economy’s competitiveness, especially 
for a manufacturing country like Italy. For decades the literature on international trade has 
focused on the characteristics of countries and industries, developing the concepts of 
comparative advantage and economies of scale. More recent empirical studies (Bernard and 
Jensen 1999, 2004a, 2004b) and theoretical works (Melitz 2003; Bernard et al. 2003; Melitz 
and Ottaviano 2008) have concentrated on firms and their high degree of heterogeneity. 
Consistently with this new microeconomic approach, it is worthwhile to focus on the 
characteristics of exporting firms.  
                                                 
16 On the other hand, one could also claim that ICT and, especially, network technologies, bring about a 
reduction in transaction costs (both with other firms as well as with clients), thus giving small-sized companies 
greater opportunities to improve their access to markets. In the Italian case, these benefits could be limited to 
the diffuse presence of industrial districts, a form of cooperation between businesses that was finalized toward 
greater interaction between firms. 
 
17In the United States and in the main European countries exporting firms are few in 
relation to the total number of firms in business; they are generally larger, more productive, 
more profitable and more capital-intensive than non-exporters and pay higher wages
17. The 
set of exporting firms is highly heterogeneous, comprising a legion of small exporters and a 
few “superstars” which alone account for the bulk of national exports (Mayer and Ottaviano 
2007).  
According to Istat-ICE data on the universe of Italian exporters, in 2006 – a year not 
affected by the effects of recent financial crisis and international recession – firms exporting 
goods were about 190,000, 4.2 per cent of all firms and employing about 20 per cent of the 
total workforce. About 80 per cent of the exporters had fewer than 16 employees, but they 
accounted for only 16 per cent of total exports compared with 60 per cent for those with 100 
or more employees. The propensity to export increases significantly with firm size: the share 
of exporters rises from 3.5 per cent among firms with fewer than 20 workers to 41 among 
those with 20-49 workers and exceeds 50 per cent for firms with 50 or more workers. More 
than 75 per cent of Italian exporting firms sell some products in the EU market, which takes 
60 per cent of total exports. By contrast, the percentage that has entered non-EU markets is 
very low (20 per cent in North America and East Asia). The size distribution of exporting 
firms by outlet market is more uneven, the farther away the outlet market. Some 75 per cent 
of exporting firms with fewer than 20 workers and nearly all those with 50 or more workers 
sell in the EU, while less than 15 per cent of small exporting firms but 60 per cent of those 
with more than 100 workers reach the dynamic markets of East Asia. Firm size is also 
positively correlated with the number of foreign markets in which firms sell their products
18.  
Bugamelli, Cipollone and Infante (2000) underscore the importance of firm size as a 
condition for operating on foreign markets. The role of size becomes increasingly important 
with the degree of sophistication of international activities, starting from exports, the 
simplest form, to commercial agreements, technical and production agreements and, finally, 
direct investment
19. Strong is also the link between internationalization and innovation: 
companies with production facilities abroad are also more likely to engage in product and 
process innovation and R&D, have a higher proportion of high-school and university 
graduates among their staff, and a higher propensity to carry out organizational innovation
20.  
Globalization is not only the conquest of foreign markets, but also increased 
competitive pressures. As reminded in section 2, the growing importance of low wage 
countries in international trade has had a significant impact on the Italian economy. The 
analyses conducted on firm-level data from various countries suggest quite clearly that firms 
in advanced economies can escape those new competitive pressures by increasing their R&D 
                                                 
17 See, among others, the contribution by Barba Navaretti, Bugamelli, Schivardi, Altomonte, Horgos and 
Maggioni (2011) that use homogeneous firm-level data on Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, 
and UK. 
18 Overall, 43 per cent of exporting firms sell their products in a single market, 74 per cent in not more than five 
markets, and only 5 per cent in more than 25 different markets in a given year. 
19 More recent works have shown that not only size but also productivity is greater on average among the firms 
that adopt more complex and costly forms of internationalization (Castellani and Zanfei 2007; Casaburi, Gattai 
and Minerva 2008; Benfratello and Razzolini 2008; Federico 2008). 
20 All these results are consistent with the theoretical models with heterogeneous firms according to which FDI 
involves higher fixed costs than exporting (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004). 
 
18expenditure, improving their products’ quality, hiring high-skilled workers (Bernard, Jensen 
and Schott 2006a; Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen 2010; Buono 2011; Martin and Mejean 
2011; Mion and Zhou 2011). All these activities impose the payment of high up-front costs, 
often precluded to smaller firms. In the case of Italy, non-technological innovations – related 
to marketing, branding, distribution networks, post-sales assistance – have proved to be 
important in strengthening firms’ competitiveness in the post-euro era (Bugamelli, Schivardi 
and Zizza 2009). Again, for these innovations to be viable and economically convenient, 
their costs need to be spread over a large customer base, something easier for larger firms. 
3.3  Firm size and productivity 
Since larger firms have a higher propensity to R&D and innovation in general, tend to 
adopt better management practices, hire more likely skilled workers, and have the financial 
strength to invest in capital and new technologies, it is not surprising that they turn out to be 
also more efficient. In Figure 1 we plot the value added per hour worked, at constant prices, 
computed on the Bank of Italy’s sample of manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees 
(Invind). The data, averaged by class size, show that indeed the level of productivity grows 
with the size of the firm. With some exceptions, often due to the small sample size as in the 
case of firms with more than 500 employees, the growth rate of productivity has been 
increasing in firm size: since 2001, which is the first year when firms with 20-49 employees 
have been included in Invind,  to 2007 (before the recent international recession) the 
cumulated growth of productivity has been less than 1 per cent for the smallest firms (20-49 
employees), around 15 per cent for firms with 50-99 and with 200-449 employees, about 8 
per cent for the other firms (100-199 and more than 500 employees). The positive 
relationship between firm size and productivity growth is, even more neatly, confirmed 
looking at the short expansionary phases in 2005-07.  
4.  The size distribution of firms  
Given the evidence reviewed in the previous section, it comes quite immediate to 
relate the recent unsatisfactory performance of the Italian economy in terms of productivity, 
innovation and technology adoption to the size of its firms. In 2007 Italy’s average firm size 
was equal to 4 employees, less than that of not only Germany (13.3) and UK (11.1), but also 
France (5.8) and Spain (5.3). It is a structural feature that is not driven by the sectoral 
composition of production: according to a shift-share analysis, the firm size gap between 
Italy and the EU-15 average is almost exclusively due to the within-sector component 
(Banca d’Italia 2010). The average size of Italian firms is smaller than that of the other main 
European competitors in all manufacturing sectors (Table 2). These average figures hide a 
much skewed firm size distribution: in 2009 out of 4.5 millions of active firms, 95 per cent 
has less than 10 employees and overall absorbs 47 per cent of total employment (Istat 2011). 
There are also 3 millions of firms without employees that correspond to 65.2 per cent of the 
total number of firms. On the other end of the distribution, firms with more than 250 
employees are only 3,718, about a third in the manufacturing sector.  
The firm size structure of the Italian productive system has been more or less the same 
in the last 3-4 decades. But how was it before and along through its history as a single united 
country?   
Again data availability constraints our analysis. As already clear from Table 1, the 
census data are available since 1911 and only for the manufacturing sector. This is not too 
 
19much of a loss, though. As argued in section 2, 1911 is a key year to draw a quite reliable 
picture of the industrialization process that has slowly interested the Italian economy in the 
first 50 years after its unification. Secondly, the manufacturing industry has been and still is 
central to technology advancements and globalization waves, thus representing the natural 
focus of our paper. 
Table 3 shows average firm size by manufacturing sector for 10 out of the last 100 
years. The figure for the whole sector follows an inversely U-shaped trend: equal to 5.8 
employees per firm, average firm size increased, with the only exception of the interwar 
period, until the beginning of the 1980s and then started declining. This pattern is quite 
striking in some specific sectors. Textile, a sector that we classified within the first industrial 
revolution, has an average firm size of more than 50 employees until 1927; it is now at about 
9. Even more striking is the expansion after the WWII and the fast reduction since 1980s in 
some sectors of the second industrial revolution: chemicals, steel, automotives and other 
forms of transportations. The figure for office machinery confirms the relevant and very 
large presence of Italian producers until 1971 and then subsequent dramatic collapse.  
Thus, while the predominance of small-sized firms has always distinguished Italy’s 
industrial history from that of front-runner nations like the United States, Germany, France 
and United Kingdom, a look through Italian firms’ average firm size across 100 years 
provide first signals that something has changed, in particular after the 1970-80s. 
Again it is useful to focus on the tails of the distribution, in particular on the right tail 
of the largest firms, i.e., those that, according to our thesis, are more capable (and therefore 
relevant for a country) to catch up with new technologies and face globalization challenges. 
To this aim, Table 4 reports the share of manufacturing workers employed in units with 
more than 500 workers by sector. Coherently with our thesis, very large firms were highly 
predominant in textiles until WWII (with 40 per cent of sectoral employment), in chemicals, 
energy, rubber and plastics, steel during the golden age (with about 50 per cent of each 
sector’s total employment), and automotives where the employment share has been stable 
around 80 per cent from 1937 to 1981. Large firms in office machinery absorbed 90 per cent 
of all employees during the 1960s. In the last 3-4 decades the weight of large firms 
decreased in all sectors, reaching 3 per cent in textiles, 7 in rubber and plastics, 45 per cent 
in office machinery. 
In Table 5 sectors are grouped according to our definition of industrial revolutions. In 
the sectors of the first industrial revolution, the employment share of large firms (> 500 
employees) has been stable slightly below 20 per cent until 1951, after which it started a 
steady decline until reaching 3 per cent in 1996. The same share for the smallest firms (<10 
employees), very high since 1911 (46.6 per cent), declined in the post-WWII period reaching 
29.4 per cent in 1971: since then it increased again to about one third. Combining these two 
pieces of evidence, it results quite clearly the growing importance of medium-sized firms. 
Turning to the sectors of the second industrial revolution, we see the employment share of 
large firms be steadily around 30 per cent until 1981 and then decrease fast. The growth and 
collapse of Olivetti depicts the evolution of the employment share of large firms in the third 
industrial revolution sectors: it went from 23.3 per cent in 1927 to 40 in 1971 and then 
collapsed to 18.8 in 1996. 
Since our thesis evolves around the role of big businesses as driving forces of an 
economy, it is worth focusing on them using firm-level data on the top 200 Italian 
 
20manufacturing firms (Giannetti and Vasta, 2006). These data are available in the database 
Imita.db
21  for the years 1913, 1921, 1927, 1936, 1952, 1960 and 1971, and have been 
complemented by us with similar information found on Mediobanca’s publication for the 
years 1981, 1991, and 2001. For any single firm, we know the name, the sector, the 
geographic location, the value of corporate stock holdings and of total assets. 
A first look at the sectoral composition of the top 200 firms confirms the conclusion 
drawn from census data. At the beginning of the last century Italy had large players 
operating in the sectors of the first and the second industrial revolution. The importance of 
the latter kept growing until the end of seventies, while the former one started contracting 
after the WWI. Among this sample of big businesses, the relevance of firms in the ICT-
related sectors has always been limited. In other terms, if we look at largest manufacturing 
firms Italy resembles today the structure it has at the beginning of the 1980s. 
The Imita database does not allow to study the evolution of large firms, since the only 
quantitative figure –i.e., total assets – is not homogeneous over time. Therefore we have 
estimated the number of employees
22 so as to compare the data on the top 200 firms with 
census data
23. 
Figure 2 reports the ratio between employment in the top 200 firms and the total 
employment of census data by the three groups of sectors related to the technological 
revolutions. For all three groups the reduction in the weight of the largest firms after 1971 is 
quite visible: in the case of sectors of the third industrial revolution it is again striking the 
effect of Olivetti’s collapse. Overall, the share of employment of top 200 firms decreased 
from 70 per cent before WWI to 40 in 1991 and 2001.  
The reduction of large businesses’ importance may also be due to their direct 
downsizing. In Table 7 we show different points of the size distribution of the top 200 firms. 
Despite some inevitable measurement error in our estimates of employees, it is quite 
surprising that, with very few exceptions, for all technological revolution groupings and any 
point of the distribution the highest number is recorded either in 1971 or in 1981. After those 
dates, the minimum, the median, the mean and the maximum values all decrease. 
                                                 
21 The database Imita.db has been created using various statistical sources, especially the publications of 
Notizie Statistiche which refers to all stock companies. The series, covering the period 1911-72, was started by 
Credito Italiano and then taken over in the 1920s by Assonime. 
22 To calculate the number of employees at the corporate level we followed these steps. First, from the Notizie 
Statistiche volumes we gathered the data, when available, for horsepower and the number of employees per 
firm. Until 1952 Notizie Statistiche regularly furnished data regarding horsepower while rarely giving 
information regarding the number of employees; the situation gets reversed for the succeeding years. In 
Mediobanca’s publications, instead, the number of employees per firm is almost always provided from 1981 
on. In a successive stage, the missing data is inferred using the estimated coefficients that come out by running 
year-by-year regressions with the available data. The empirical specification was the following: 
i r s i i assets y            
where y corresponds to horsepower (up through 1952) or number of employees (following years), assets is the 
value of total assets at the firm level (information always available in Imita.db), s   is a set of dummies based 
on sectors (based on a classification of Ateco2002) and  r  is a set of dummies by regions. As regards the third 
step, for the period between 1911 and 1952 the number of employees was calculated by using sectoral data 
regarding horsepower per worker available in census data (Table 7), published by G. Federico (2003). 
23 Given the slight misalignments between Census and Imita data (1911 vs 1913;  1936 vs 1937; 1951 vs 1952;  
1960 vs 1961), the comparison is a bit imprecise. 
 
21As pointed by many commentators (Trento and Warglein 2003), the downsizing of 
firms in the last decades is a common phenomenon across all advanced countries: it is very 
likely the outcome of the organizational innovations brought about by the new technologies 
of information and communication. By allowing a better monitoring of the single phases of a 
production process, ICT indeed allowed firms to adopt more horizontal management 
practices within firm and make a stronger recourse to external outsourcing. Both changes 
favor a reduction in firm size.  
Now the point for us becomes to show that the downsizing of Italian firms have been 
stronger than in the other advanced economies, despite the fact that the initial size 
distribution of firms was already highly fragmented. Some evidence, though scant, in this 
direction is provided in Table 6 where, using different sources and trying to take into 
account differences due to the unit of observation (plants vs firms), we show data on the 
employment share in plants/firms with more than 100 workers for Italy, France and 
Germany. Between 1961 and 2001, that share decreased in Italy by 15 percentage points 
against around 10 in France and Italy; considering the initial level, the reduction in Italy 
amounted to more than 30 per cent, as double as that recorded in France and Germany. 
5. Entrepreneurship 
We should use caution and delicacy when discussing entrepreneurship. In fact, 
entrepreneurship is innovation, decision making at the highest levels, risk, and the ability to 
take advantage of favorable business conditions. Of course, we are talking about a factor of 
development which is difficult to separate from the larger context. The renowned economic 
historian Sir John Habakkuk used to say that great generals are not created during periods of 
peace as a way of explaining the “lazy” English entrepreneurs of the Victorian era (Amatori 
2006).  
That being said, what we see in post-unification Italy is the presence of a group of 
entrepreneurs (though a minority, they were definitely well trained) who were able to take 
full advantage of the opportunities offered by the biggest economic operator of the nation – 
the State. This intertwining of patriotism and business dealings is evident in the events that 
brought Pietro Bastogi to establish, in 1862, “Società Strade Ferrate Meridionali”, the 
country’s biggest firm at the time as it was created with the then stratospheric amount of one 
hundred million lire (Coppini 2003).  In the same manner, it could also be seen in the 
Perrone brothers’ project to transform Ansaldo into a group that, starting with minerals, 
would be capable of manufacturing anything from machinery and warships to automobiles 
and electrical systems for telecommunications (Webster 1979). Probably the best example of 
the ties between business and the State is Terni, a sort of public armory that was entrusted to 
a private entrepreneur, Vincenzo Stefano Breda, who already headed a large company that 
worked because of public orders – “Società Veneta di Costruzioni”
24.  
Along with these examples of government control or political capitalism, there was a 
vast segment of firms that strove to create sectorial interdependencies that were almost 
                                                 
24 The link between business and politics is such that, when the State is forced to save the almost bankrupt 
Terni (which had been brought to this point by some administrative maneuverings of Breda) it then proceeded 
to nominate the wily businessman as a Senator, meaning that he could only be judged by a special court – the 
entire Senate brought together as a high court of justice! Italy’s ruling class was not able to abandon to its own 
fate a project like that of Breda but put itself in the same shoes as the newly nominated Senator (Bonelli, 1975). 
 
22always self-financed. The business leaders of this section included some of the first great 
entrepreneurs in the textile (silk, cotton, and wool manufacturers) sector (Federico 1994; 
Romano 1992; Roverato 1986). Though not refusing State support to gain market control via 
cartel agreements, these entrepreneurs knew how to keep abreast of the latest developments 
(technical and organizational) that evolved around the world. Industry sectors and sizes in 
this vast area of self-financed firms were varied. They ranged from the first attempts of 
standardized production in foods to similar trials in leather and shoe manufacturing
25. As 
pointed in section 1, the vast majority were either small or micro-small businesses related to 
agriculture or with origins tied to the dismantling of the corporative system (Colli 2002). 
This is probably the reason for the persistent Italian familism.  
With the age of the Belle Epoque and the first round of globalization that began in 
1896 we start to see clusters of entrepreneurs who have innovation as the foundation of their 
actions. Giovanni Agnelli was the first to understand that the automobile was not a toy for 
the wealthy but a product destined for mass consumption and capable of transforming 
civilization (Castronovo 1971). Alberto and his brother Piero Pirelli undertook the 
consolidation of the rubber business created by their father years earlier. They transformed 
Pirelli into a large multinational that, at the beginning of the 1900s, operated in Spain, South 
America, and even in the very heart of international capitalism – Southampton in Great 
Britain (Bigazzi 1981). Giorgio Enrico Falck, a technician of Alsatian origins, transformed 
steel production in Italy by introducing the electric oven, a new way of production that 
offered greater flexibility. Falck was able to do that without government commissions as he 
took advantage of urban and industrial development that predominated in northern Italy 
(Pozzobon 1982). 
But, as much as this form of capitalism was innovative and on par with the most 
significant international competitors of the era, its dimensions were still limited and it was 
not transformed into a diffused capitalism like what occurred in the United States or 
Germany (Amatori and Colli 2011). As already pointed out, the internal market’s dimension 
and insularity were the main reasons for the limited development of firms.  
International markets helped to some extent. In the years after WWI Italy possessed a 
number of well-organized and highly competitive multinationals such as Fiat and 
Montecatini (chemicals); by the mid-Twenties the largest Italian firm was Snia, created by 
Riccardo Guaino, a tycoon who held a real hegemony on manufacturing artificial fibers on a 
worldwide basis (AA.VV., 1993). However, Italian firms faced stiff competition in foreign 
markets
26 and suffered, in the interwar period, from increasing instability in the international 
economic scenario. Moments of success alternated with unexpected setbacks and ruinous 
falls. In 1922 Fiat was in a potentially risky situation as it exported 70 per cent of its 
production. The company decided to focus on reinforcing its political ties in Italy, a move 
that proved in 1930 when Benito Mussolini exercised his authority to kick Ford out of the 
country (Castronovo 1971). An even more remarkable example is that of Montecatini. By 
the end of the Twenties Montecatini was already a colossal protagonist of Italy’s economy. 
From its origins in the mining sector, over time it had undergone a process of vertical 
                                                 
25 The process of centralizing and decentralizing production then extended to include other goods for 
consumers and their households. 
26 Breda (locomotives manufacturing) discovered first hand when it was kicked out by its German competitors 
in markets such as Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Licini 1994). 
 
23integration starting in 1920 when it took over the two major producers of the chemical 
fertilizer industry, “Unione Concimi” and “Colla e Concimi”. Two years later Montecatini 
reached a major step when it bought the patents for the production of nitrogenous fertilizers 
from Giacomo Fauser of Novara
27. Since fertilizer production calls for significant 
investments in hydroelectric plants, an absolute control of the internal market was 
fundamental. Mussolini took Donegani’s side in the battle with the equally strong 
Federconsorzi (association of Italian farmers), which was openly supported by the powerful 
Fascist leader, Italo Balbo and in 1931 conceded a prohibitively high duty on nitrogenous 
fertilizers, a move that allowed Montecatini to remain the only player in the Italian market 
(Amatori 1990). Still, the support of the regime had its price as it was accompanied by 
further requests for industrial rescues from the Fascist government, including the takeover of 
inefficient firms operating in the chemical and mining sectors, the continued usage of 
obsolete methods which were a burden on large firms. So significant was the impact of these 
measures that we can attribute to them much of the responsibility for the irreparable crisis of 
the Sixties (Amatori 1990). 
Bargaining with political power was a common practice among Italy’s major 
entrepreneurs. Arturo Bocciardo, leader of Terni, was skilled in working the system and 
some of the agreements he reached are true masterpieces. After WWI, steel production for 
war purposes was no longer a good business and it had become a source of steep losses. 
Therefore, Bocciardo decided to put the company’s focus on the production of electricity 
and, subsequently, on the electrochemical sector. By doing so, Terni became the only Italian 
manufacturer in competition with Montecatini. Still, the company did not entirely abandon 
armament steel production. Bocciardo insisted that the “sacrifice” his company was making 
be rewarded with new tariffs in the electricity industry as well as an important share for 
Terni of the chemical alliances in effect at the end of the Twenties (Bonelli 1975).  
Italian capitalism was not only limited to its ties with the public sector and regulation. 
In the years preceding the Great Depression, a good-sized segment of Italy’s business leaders 
studied the American model based on high production volumes and, as a consequence, high 
salaries that lent themselves to greater consumption. Undoubtedly Fiat wanted to “do things 
the way Ford does” when, in 1923, it inaugurated Lingotto. Emulating Ford was even more 
apparent in 1936 when Giovanni Agnelli, in his 70s and without a direct heir
28, utilized the 
profits made during the war in Ethiopia to build the large horizontal factory of Mirafiori 
(Castronovo 1971). But the limits of the internal market could still be felt. Lingotto’s 
director, Ugo Gobbato, visited Detroit in the Twenties to see Ford’s plant in operation. In the 
report that sent back to Agnelli he noted “their production line is like an Alpine torrent that 
forcefully runs down the mountain. In comparison, ours is like a pond in the field” (Bigazzi 
                                                 
27 This seemed like the ideal solution to the age-old problem of procuring a reliable source of nitrogen which 
previously had been extracted from guano imported from Chile or was created via the complicated Haber-
Bosch system, a process so difficult that no one had enjoyed success, even after the defeat of World War I 
forced the Germans to render details of the process freely. The method created by Giacomo Fauser, instead, 
was based on air, water and electricity. This put Montecatini in a favorable light with the Fascist regime as the 
Fauser method stood as a synthesis of ruralism, warmongering (synthetic nitrogen was also utilized in 
manufacturing explosives) and autarky. 
28 His son Edoardo had been killed in a tragic accident the year before. 
 
241980). In fact, at the time Fiat manufactured 200 automobiles a day while the Ford plant 
produced 3,000
29.  
Has it ever been possible to speak of managerial capitalism in Italy? Or of a system 
where a diffused ownership allows salaried managers to make high level decisions regarding 
the allocation of corporate resources?  
Theoretically something like this would have been possible in the electric industry that 
was dominated by large firms with numerous shareholders, companies like Edison, SADE, 
Sip, and SME. The reality, however, was different and only achieved by a happy few 
(wealthy families like Agnelli, Pirelli, Feltrinelli, Volpi, Cini, Marchi, etc.) who effectively 
used mischievous ownership schemes, corporate pyramids, cross shareholdings, and multiple 
vote shares.  In these firms salaried managers operated under a clear mission: they were 
functionaries whose principal role was to make sure that the affluent families received hefty 
dividends (Segreto 2005)
30.   
With the dawn of the State as entrepreneur, managers start to take on a greater 
entrepreneurial role. At the moment of its creation in 1933, Istituto di Ricostruzione 
Industriale (IRI) controlled 40 per cent of the publicly traded companies on the stock 
exchange. The man behind IRI’s creation was Alberto Beneduce, a technocrat who had 
acquired much experience as a collaborator of Francesco Saverio Nitti, an influential 
politician of southern Italy. Beneduce’s first objective as head of IRI was to break the ties 
between bank and enterprise which tended to move in tandem; once this had been 
accomplished, it would be possible to start privatizing the firms that had been made healthy. 
This second objective was only partially achieved because many of the firms taken over by 
IRI were in sectors like steel, machinery, shipbuilding and telecommunications rendering 
them not only difficult to find new buyers but also (and above all) expensive to operate. 
Thus Beneduce found himself permanently in charge of industrial concerns and based 
his actions on precise guidelines. First of all, ownership of the firms would remain in the 
hands of the State (so as to avoid any type of fire-sale) while the companies were expected to 
act as publicly-traded concerns under civil law. Secondly, in an era of confused 
conglomerates, these companies were to adhere to the conceptual framework of industrial 
sectors. The outcome was a complex architecture with the super-holding IRI at the top 
overseeing the sectorial finance companies (1934 Finmare; 1936 STET; 1937 Finsider) that, 
in turn, oversaw the companies in their care. Lastly, Beneduce opted to entrust management 
of the IRI companies to “qualified hands”, the best managers available
31. The formula 
adopted by IRI, supported by bonds that were guaranteed by the State, was effectively an 
                                                 
29 Fordism at Fiat reached its peak in 1932 when the company’s managing director, Vittorio Valletta, offered 
his employees a variation on Ford’s plan to encourage automobile ownership among workers. In the United 
States a Ford plant worker would use approximately one fourth of his annual salary to buy his own Model T. At 
Fiat, Valletta encouraged his employees to form groups of four to buy a Balilla (then the least expensive model 
manufactured) which they would use to travel together each day to the factory and then on alternating 
weekends could take turns to use the automobile with their families (Bairati, 1983). 
30 A merciless commentary on this situation can be found in the inquiries of the economic commission of the 
Constitutional Assembly (Amatori, Brioschi, 1997). In those same years, Ettore Conti, in his “Taccuino di un 
borghese” (Notebook of the bourgeousie) talks of Italian capitalism’s feudal regression in the final years of 
Fascism (Romeo 1988). 
31 These were individuals like Ugo Bordoni (STET) and Agostino Rocca (Finsider). 
 
25ingenious device for overcoming the gap in Italy between the financial needs of industrial 
development and the capital actually available. For the subsequent transformation into a long 
lasting and consistent managerial capitalism, however, IRI still had a weak point: ownership 
was anything but diffuse as the owner was a hard-to-please master – the State – which, once 
the early years of benign neglect had come to an end, started to show its weight (Amatori 
2000). 
In the golden years of the international economy that followed the end of WWII, Italy 
experienced a convergence of top managers from State-owned firms with those from private 
industry. These were entrepreneurs such as Oscar Sinigaglia, Vittorio Valletta, Enrico 
Mattei, Adriano Olivetti, and Giuseppe Luraghi. Sinigaglia, for example, brought to fruition 
a plan for steel that he had been envisioning since 1910; in less than a decade the plan 
advanced Italy from ninth to 6
th place in the international classification of steel producing 
nations
32. To those who objected that the plan called for firing thousands of workers, 
Sinigaglia (who was attentive to social problems) would reply that, by manufacturing quality 
steel in great quantities, the plan would actually give a powerful boost to the machinery 
industry and this would be a way to reabsorb those who lost their jobs with the 
modernization of Italian steel manufacturing.  
Common among these entrepreneurs was their ability to play in the major leagues, to 
believe that the wealth of a nation can be increased so much so that the game did not end 
with a tied score. Italian firms could then take advantage of economies of scale that exceeded 
the collusive contractual ties between political powers and competitors (Amatori and Colli 
1999). Thus in Fiat Valletta was able to increase production tenfold over the course of a 
decade (Bairati 1983); Mattei of ENI assembled an extensive methane network in northern 
Italy and, taking advantage of methane, construct a petrochemical plant in Ravenna that in 
1956 was three times larger than the next biggest plant built by Montecatini in Ferrara just 
six years earlier. By doing so, Mattei’s group was able to take over the monopoly of 
nitrogenous fertilizers (Amatori and Colli 1999). Adriano Olivetti was skilled in growing the 
firm created by his father into a multinational that ranked among world leaders in the 
production of office machinery. By 1959 Olivetti was able to take over a large US firm, 
Underwood, while it pursued expansion in electronics and the production of semiconductors 
(Bricco 2005). Giuseppe Luraghi transformed Alfa Romeo, which before the war assembled 
fewer than five hundred automobiles in a year, into a real industrial firm, by introducing new 
models like the “1900” in 1950 and the Giulietta in 1954. In a four year period between the 
late 50s and the early 60s, Alfa Romeo manufactured more than two times as many 
automobiles as it had manufactured in the previous half century. By doing so, the company 
was able to position itself into a segment of the Italian market that made it the second most 
important player after Fiat, exceeding the family-owned car manufacturer, Lancia (Amatori 
1996). 
Up to this point we have only dealt with long-time entrepreneurs. But the so-called 
“Economic Miracle” also gave birth to new entrepreneurs like those who became important 
players in the white goods industry: Lino Zanussi, Eden Fumagalli, Giovanni Borghi, and 
                                                 
32 Sinigaglia’s plan involved the construction, thanks to funds from the Marhsall Plan, of a large new full-cycle 
plant outfitted with the most advanced technology (continuous rolling mills) in Cornigliano, a highly focused 
specialization in two other full-cycle plants (Piombino and Bagnoli), and the closure of a few obsolete 
operations. 
 
26Aristide Merloni. In fact, Italian industry experienced an overall strengthening with the step 
up from artisanal shops to factories. Tailors became fashion industrialists, carpenters were 
transformed into furniture manufacturers, and cobblers became producers of footwear 
(Amatori and Colli 1999).  
Starting from the 1970s this competitive industrial apparatus started to collapse. This 
was the period in which we see a big wave of family businesses unprepared to efficiently 
deal with successions (the case of Olivetti in computer manufacturing is a good example). 
The system as a whole was unable to grab on to the opportunities that accompanied the 
nationalization of electricity; at the same time a dramatic form of social unrest manifested 
itself in the factories
33. The decline of private big business went hand in hand with the 
dramatic defeat of the big State owned enterprises, in a climate of shocks, both external 
(energy and monetary) and internal (terrorism). 
In this same period the weight of small businesses never diminished and their utility 
seems to be rediscovered in the turbulent 1970s when everything else appeared to be 
disintegrating. Small businesses were the vital solution because, in a nation seen as incapable 
of creating a system, they easily lent themselves to being organized into industrial districts 
(Colli 2002 and 2011). 
In 1991 when Italy’s Parliament decided to draft legislation to safeguard industrial 
districts, a census accounted for 190 of them scattered around the country, offering 
employment to 2.4 million workers, 40  per cent of the nation’s manufacturing work force 
(Brusco and Paba 1997). Industrial districts are homogenous territories that specialize in 
manufacturing goods that call for a rather sophisticated division of labor, both horizontal as 
well as vertical. This specialization extended from goods to include the machinery and 
intermediate components necessary to produce them. That industrial districts were more 
diffuse in Northern and Central Italy can be explained in large part with the history of the 
local territory: the heritage of the guild system, enterprising attitude, a strong work ethic, and 
a wealth of manual skills found in the sharecropping system at the base of many local 
economies. These were highly complementary to the refined consumers of the many Italian 
“capitals” as well as the cosmopolitan entrepreneurial style of merchants (Fuà and Zacchia 
1983; Becattini 1998). 
 The industrial districts were the seedbed of the so-called “Fourth Capitalism” with its 
mid-size firms that excluded big State owned enterprises, large private corporations, and 
small companies (Colli 2003). By the beginning of the 21
st century, more than 1500 
businesses with annual sales between 150 million and 1.5 billion euros were operative in 
Italy. Most are concentrated in niches, often global; thus we might define them as “pocket 
multinationals”. These are the firms at the heart of the Italian economy today and a clear sign 
of its metamorphosis (Berta 2004).  
Still, these businesses have their limits. On one hand, the industries where they operate 
are sectors that focus primarily on manufacturing goods for consumers and households, 
perhaps too far from the technological path-breakers. On the other hand, a family 
management style that favors ownership over performance. 
                                                 
33 All this came to an end only at the beginning of the Eighties (Scalfari and Turani 1974; Berta 1998). 
 
27It seems plausible that family firms have a higher risk aversion, as a consequence of 
the stronger correlation between business and family wealth, with negative effects on 
growth, innovation and internationalization
34. Family-owned firms have also a low 
propensity to hire managers not belonging to the same family, even when managerial skills 
are not available within the family. According to homogeneous firm-level data on 7 
European countries (EFIGE data), in Italy 86 per cent of manufacturing firms with at least 
10 employees belong to a family, a figure in line with that of France (80), Spain (83) and UK 
(81), smaller than that of Germany (90). Italy becomes peculiar when one looks at the 
family-owned firms where the whole management belongs to the same family: these are 
two-thirds in Italy, against one-fourth in France and Germany and much one-tenth in UK.  
Firms that are both family-owned and wholly family-managed tend to adopt worse 
managerial practices, like a very centralized management approach and little use of 
performance-based remuneration schemes. These “bad” practices are associated with lower 
productivity and profits (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bandiera et al., 2008), innovation 
and R&D propensity (Bugamelli, Cannari, Lotti and Magri 2011). In general, we believe that 
the negative implications of such management structures, much more diffused among small 
and medium enterprises, may not be very relevant in periods of stable growth, but become 
quite  limiting when a firm is called to face significant external shocks with the need of 
engaging in risky activities like innovation and internationalization. 
6. Concluding  remarks 
Since its unification, the Italian productive system has made exceptional progresses. 
Alone among the Mediterranean countries, Italy had been able to position itself as one of the 
most industrialized countries very soon, already before WWI. One hundred and fifty years 
after 1861 Italy is beyond any doubt still one of the richest and developed countries in the 
world. As said, this is an outstanding success, especially if one thinks to the initial conditions 
and to the constraints characterizing the domestic market at least until the 1950s.  
From the last decade of the 19
th century to the end of the 1960s, Italy’s economic 
performance benefited from the actions of some private entrepreneurs that, though often with 
some delay with respect to the other advanced European economies, have been able to catch 
up with modern technologies, face international markets, make their firms grow, and, at the 
end, contribute to the establishment of a competitive industrial sector. Private entrepreneurs 
have been come abreast, especially after IRI’s creation in 1933 and more intensively after 
                                                 
34 Michelacci and Schivardi (2008) use the share of family firms to proxy diversification opportunities in a 
country. They find where these opportunities are lower, the sectors characterized by higher “specific” risk 
(measured by the industry- and firm-specific component of the volatility of annual returns) have lower 
productivity and investment growth and a lower business birth rate. The large share of family firms in Italy 
could explain recent poor performance, especially in the sectors more exposed to international competition. 
Cucculelli (2007) suggests that family firms may be more oriented towards maintaining control in the long run 
than in strengthening profitability and growth. This could make them less responsive to demand and thus less 
able to exploit market opportunities. In the period 1995-2004 the sales of family firms were less sensitive than 
non-family firms to variations in demand for their sector’s products, especially if they were financially 
constrained. Partially in line with these results but with a more precise identification of family firms, Bianco, 
Golinelli and Parigi (2008) analyze the investment decisions of Italian firms in the period 1996-2007 and find 
that investment in family firms are relatively more sensitive to uncertainty. This is partly due to a lower wealth 
diversification of the owners of family firms and a corresponding higher risk aversion, since the effect 
diminishes as the interest held in the firm decreases. 
 
28WWII, of State-owned enterprises that played in capital- and technology- intensive 
industries a key role in the modernization process of the Italian economy. As already pointed 
out, these positive developments occurred, in particular until WWII, in spite of the small size 
and scarce dynamism of a domestic market, still pervaded by consumption levels, styles and 
needs proper of an agricultural, backward society.  
This industrial structure, populated by some big businesses competitive in advanced 
sectors and a mass of small and medium enterprises, recorded a significant, maybe not from 
a quantitative but surely from a qualitative point of view, change starting from the 1970s. In 
particular, it is the failure of big businesses in “core” sectors to have deprived the Italian 
economic system of the ability to fully exploit the benefits from the new information and 
communication technologies – both on the production and the adoption side – and to face the 
new serious challenges posed by the last globalization wave. Example of these failures were 
the demise of historical firms like Montecatini and Olivetti, the significant reduction of 
Pirelli and the uncertain future for Fiat (Gallino 2003). 
Italy managed to remain among the richest countries thanks to the competitive 
advantages gained by its many small and medium firms, its industrial districts (and, today, 
“pocket multinationals”), as described by Michael Porter in his The Competitive Advantage 
of Nations.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, these firms have generated employment, sustainable 
development and, last but not least, a steady growth in foreign trade which allowed the 
country to counterbalance the heavily negative trade balance in high-tech industries and 
energy. But, in the last decade or so, they, with their peculiar and outdated organizational 
structures, with their difficulties in financing innovation and internationalization, appear to 
have exhausted their propulsive push. Leaving aside the deficiencies in the financial 
system
35, the vast majority of Italian small firms and industrial districts are traditionally and 
historically present in craft-based industries, maybe with an high content of style and tacit 
knowledge, but barely able to develop proprietary, in house technologies in the third 
industrial revolution sectors. In the same vein, their ability to conquer the fast growing (but 
risky) Asian markets with their products and services is negligible. 
The structural conditions of the Italian manufacturing industry at the beginning of 
2000 were astonishingly similar to those at work when Italy entered the first globalization 
wave. Basically, and with only few relevant exceptions (machinery), the Italian international 
competitive advantage was located in traditional industries, sometimes characterized by 
high-value added activities – especially as far as niche productions are concerned – but more 
often exposed to the competitive challenges brought by developing countries. As a 
consequence, since the beginning of 2000, the Italian trade balance started to deteriorate; 
imports of high-tech and high-value added products were not anymore offset by exports in 
light, traditional or even specialized industries, nor (as it was at the end of the nineteenth 
century) Italy could enjoy of a huge amount of remittances from emigrants.  
What are the main causes behind the failure of big businesses in Italy? 
Much has been said about Italy’s “failed landing” into a key player in the international 
economic scenario, unlike a country such as Japan which in many ways resembled Italy 
                                                 
35 The venture capital industry has still a negligible dimension in Italy (Banca d’Italia, 2009). 
 
29(Pirani 1991; Pivato 2011). Undoubtedly, the Italian entrepreneurs that were protagonists 
during the golden age must accept responsibility for their part in this failed landing when, for 
example, they did little to govern the social change brought about by their actions both 
inside as well as outside the factories. Italian business leaders failed to come together to ask 
for a reform of capitalism that would have brought about modern new regulation like 
antitrust and measures to protect investors in the stock market as well as encourage 
institutional investors. It is well known that in this panorama there were exceptions like 
Adriano Olivetti, who called for workers to participate in company life, as well as a 
harmonization of corporate needs with those of the surrounding community and a balanced 
development of various regions of the country (Bricco 2005). But Olivetti shared with other 
captains of industry of his time a management style where management of the firm was 
centralized in his hands; upon his unexpected demise, the managers who took over the reins 
decided to abandon some of the futuristic projects in electronics introduced by Adriano 
Olivetti. This kind of failure is comparable to what happened with some managers of State-
owned enterprises who were incapable of saying no to some of the outlandish requests that 
they received from political figures more interested in growth, acquisitions and industrial 
rescues for electoral reasons than anything else (Osti and Ranieri 1983). 
Entrepreneurial failures, especially in the high-tech industries, negatively affected the 
supply-side of the economy, with a loss of competitiveness that, in combination with needed 
but painful macroeconomic adjustments during the 1990s, ended up depressing the internal 
demand and triggering a vicious circle.  
Obviously, when talking about the need of changing the rules of the game and 
modernize a country’s institutional framework, the State and the policy makers are in the 
frontline. As repeatedly argued, the relationship between businesses and government was 
fruitful since the beginning of united Italy and especially after WWII thanks to the 
formidable bulk of State-owned enterprises in capital- and technology-intensive industries. A 
situation, however, which had not been replicated in the last decades, when the State proved 
to be barely able (or unable at all) to create a framework in which the economic activity 
could take place and the efficiency of large firms, both under the profile of their international 
competitiveness and of their innovative capabilities in the most advanced industries, could 
be strengthened. We refer to the persistence of inefficient financial markets, an inexistent 
market for corporate control, the persistence of monopolistic rents, a low quality and 
efficiency of public goods, a high level of taxation and administrative and bureaucratic costs 
on economic activities.  
The negative influence of the State on the economy goes beyond the unwillingness or 
the incapacity to improve the set of rules, to modernize institutions, and to appropriately 
regulate markets. The governement can directly distort the allocation of resources. 
Exploiting a unique longitudinal dataset that combines matched employer-employee data 
with administrative archives on the universe of individuals appointed in local governments 
over the period 1985-97 in Italy, Cingano and Pinotti (2011a) quantify the private returns 
and the social costs of political connections. They find that the revenue premium granted to 
industrial firms that have in their workforce politicians belonging to the party (or coalition of 
parties) that won the elections amounts to 5.7 per cent on average; interestingly, this is 
obtained through increases in domestic sales without any productivity improvement. To 
confirm the intuition, the authors find no post-election effect in non-connected firms and in 
 
30firms connected with politicians appointed with opposition parties. As expected, the 
premium from political connections is larger for firms operating in sectors that sell more to 
the public administration, in areas characterized by higher public expenditure and higher 
level of corruption.  
Summing up, big business and Government relationships have evolved through 
different stages in the course of Italian economic history; the relationship has been 
increasingly strict, but also positive in the end, since the Unification of the country until the 
two decades of the economic miracle when the State intervention gave solution to many 
deficiencies and flaws in the Italian industrial modernization. From 1970s, however, while 
State-owned large companies in capital and technology intensive industries found 
themselves not able to escape the trap of a too ready compliance to politicians’ requirements, 
the governments repeatedly proved to be unable to provide the necessary modernization of 
the institutional framework for big business.  
How to strengthen the Italian productive system today?  
The priority objective appears to be the identification of measures that will encourage 
firms to increase their size and overcome the restrictive vision of family control and 
management. This is no easy task because it clashes with deep-rooted attitudes and the 
dominant entrepreneurial culture in Italy
36, but the spread of forms of control other than 
those centered around the family and a substantial increase in the medium-large component 
of firms, appear to be key to the survival of the Italian productive system. Well-performing 
family companies are too often weakened in their competitive potential by issues related to 
leadership succession and family members involvement. Increasing self-consciousness by 
entrepreneurs is needed in order to adopt a model of “open family firm” (Casson 1999; Colli 
2003) in which skilled managers are sided by selected family members in order to provide 
the human capital needed when a process of growth and expansion of business is made 
compulsory by the current globalization process. 
This objective can be pursued through the design of incentive mechanisms, by creating 
the managerial and organizational resources which firms often complain are in short supply, 
and by facilitating the development of instruments such as private equity for the positive role 
it can play in transition phases, like reorganizations and generational changeovers. Well 
designed policies
37 should guarantee support to firms’ R&D, innovation and 
                                                 
36 For example, interpersonal trust by sustaining cooperation among anonymous others and people outside the 
narrow circle of family members and close friends may attenuate inefficiencies (like a inefficient division of 
labor) deriving from coordination failures among the different members of an organization and even an 
economy as a whole (Putnam 1993); for these reasons, trust has long been recognized as the very fundamental 
factor behind the rise and growth of large organizations, including firms and companies (Fukuyama, 1995, La 
Porta et al. 1997). Cingano and Pinotti (2011b) test the hypothesis looking at the pattern of comparative 
advantage (in terms of value added and productivity) and the organization of production (size and number of 
firms) across Italian regions and European countries. On the Italian data they find that high-trust regions exhibit 
on average more decentralized and larger firm organizations. In particular, high-trust regions exhibit a larger 
share of value added and exports in sectors characterized by greater need-for-delegation.  
37 In Italy the scope for improvement in policy design is surely wide (Brandolini and Bugamelli 2009). It is 
necessary (and not too difficult) to increase the stability and the internal consistency of the regulatory 
framework. Reducing uncertainty over access and the instruments available helps the medium to long-term 
planning that characterizes firms’ strategic choices; the granting of any incentives or concessions should follow 
a decision-making process that prioritizes transparency and accountability. Moreover, there should be 
 
31internationalization: empirical evidence across the main advanced countries has identified 
these strategies as crucial for expanding sales and improving efficiency. What has always 
been missing in Italy is a truly working “national system of innovation”, supporting the 
networking between public and private actors and developing big and applied science, 
together with a flexible and efficient financial system. Despite the lack of reliable empirical 
analyses, the high fragmentation of the agencies and the instruments dedicated to the 
internationalization of firms surely limit their positive impact
38.   
Besides promoting greater efficiency at the firm level, policy making should facilitate 
the reallocation of resources among firms, from the least to the most productive ones. The 
aim is to create the conditions so that this reallocation can take place, while avoiding the 
temptation to subsidize firms in difficulty that do not have any concrete prospects of being 
restructured. Bankruptcy law, for firms, and the social protection net, for workers, play an 
essential role (Brandolini and Bugamelli 2009; Bobbio, Brandolini, Colonna, D’Amuri, 
Rosolia, Torrini and Zizza 2011). 
In this paper we have dealt exclusively with industrial firms. This is reasonable enough 
for the more distant years, less for the most recent period in which service sectors account 
for three-quarter of total value added. Services are very heterogeneous but greater 
contestability in some of them (above all, professional services and energy) would enable 
monopolistic rents to be reduced, benefiting both consumers and user (manufacturing) firms 
(Barone and Cingano 2010). It is worth reminding the example of the 1998 reform of the 
retail sector: thanks to the geographical differences in the elimination of restrictions on entry 
into the retail sector, Viviano (2008) could show that in the areas where the restrictions on 
the number of businesses or on the selling floorspace have been eased, the ratio of workers 
employed in the sector to the total population has increased by nearly one percentage point. 
The lowering of barriers has also led to an increase in incumbents’ productivity and a 
reduction in their profit margins, thereby spurring the use of ICT and helping to contain the 
rise in the prices of food products (Schivardi and Viviano 2011).  
Least but not last, the Italian productive system as a whole would greatly benefit from 
a significant reduction in the tax burden, in the administrative costs placed on firms in every 
phase of their life and in a overabundant and unstable legislation that increases costs of 
learning and complying with the rules (Bianco, Giacomelli and Rodano 2011). Laws are 
effective only if they are backed by an adequate system of enforcement. Various country-
specific or cross-country studies confirm the adverse impact on the economy of inefficient 
judicial systems (Kumar, Rajan and Zingales 2001; Laeven and Woodruff, 2007). In Italy, 
                                                                                                                                                       
mechanisms for monitoring and assessing policy measures with a view to selecting the most effective; to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest, these assessment should be made by independent authorities, following the best 
practices recognized at international level. Finally, economic policy must always adopt a broad perspective that 
takes account of the interconnections and complementary elements of the various instruments. 
38 While the evidence from other countries suggests that the activities of national or regional promotional 
agencies, embassies and governmental missions abroad have positive effects on exports (Lederman, Olarreaga 
and Payton 2006; Gil, Llorca and Serrano 2008; Rose 2007; Nitsch 2007), in Italy this does not seem to be the 
case. A study focusing on financial services for internationalization suggests that small and medium-sized firms 
are unfamiliar with the more complex instruments and finds limited support offered by the network of public 
agencies and organizations abroad (Onida, 2006). The latter finding is consistent with the data of the 
Mediobanca-Capitalia survey, according to which only 9 per cent of Italian exporting firms received assistance 
abroad from Italian entities or operators in the three year 2001-03. 
 
32the quality of enforcement is heavily compromised by the lengthiness of trials
39. This 
situation affects the performance of the Italian economy: comparisons across provinces have 
shown that less efficient application of the law goes together with a reduction in the birth 
rate and size of firms (Bianco and Giacomelli 2004), in the availability of credit (Jappelli, 
Pagano and Bianco 2005) and in recourse to bank debt as opposed to trade credit 
(Carmignani 2005). The numerous reforms of the civil justice system in recent years have 
for the most part been uncoordinated and fragmentary and proven to be inefficacious. 
 
 
                                                 
39 In 2006 the average first-level civil action took 966 days to complete, according to estimates based on Justice 
Ministry data. By international standards, civil trials in Italy are among the longest. According to World Bank 
estimates, in 2008 it took 1,210 days to complete a procedure for the recovery of trade credit in Italy, compared 
with 463 days on average in the OECD countries (World Bank, 2008). 
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Table 1 
Share of employees by sector  
(percentages) 
    1911  1927 1937 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 1996 2007 
             
Foodstuffs  13.7 12.5  14.7  10.3  8.9 7.1 7.8 8.8 8.9  10.3 
Tobacco 0.9  1.0  1.5 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Textiles  22.5  25.0 18.5 18.8 13.7 10.1  8.9  7.7  7.1  4.8 
Clothing  8.1  6.4 7.6 6.4 6.5 7.4 6.8 8.0 7.1 5.0 
Leather  goods  6.2  4.3 5.2 6.2 4.9 4.5 5.6 4.7 4.7 3.5 
Wood  7.8  6.9 6.5 4.9 5.3 3.7 4.1 3.6 3.5 3.7 
Paper  1.3  1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 
Publishing  2.2  2.2 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.5 
Energy  0.0  0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Chemicals  3.3  2.9 3.4 5.1 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.2 
Rubber  and  plastic  0.0  0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.4 2.1 3.4 4.1 4.4 
Glass.  cement  and  bricks  9.8  6.4 6.1 5.6 6.8 6.3 5.7 5.3 5.2 5.3 
Basic  metals  3.1  3.9 3.0 4.8 5.3 5.0 4.7 3.3 2.8 3.0 
Metallurgy  5.9  5.8 3.4 6.3 6.2 7.1 9.6  11.8  12.8  15.8 
Mechanical  instruments  3.4  5.2  8.8  8.6  11.8 13.8 10.9 10.3 11.4 12.6 
Office  machinery  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Electrical  devices  0.2  0.4 1.1 1.6 2.6 3.8 4.4 4.0 4.2 4.2 
Radios  and  televisions  0.1  0.5 1.5 1.0 1.7 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.1 1.7 
Precision  instruments  0.6  1.7 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.7 2.3 2.7 2.9 
Automotives  0.3  0.9 2.0 2.1 2.5 4.6 4.7 4.1 3.8 3.6 
Other transportation 
equipment  5.4  5.3 5.9 4.0 3.1 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.5 
Furniture and other 
manufacturing  4.9  6.5 4.5 5.8 6.4 7.4 6.9 5.9 6.4 6.2 
Recycled  materials  0.0  0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1  -  -  0.1 0.2 0.4 
Manufacturing  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
             
1st    industrial  revolution  71.4  69.6 63.3 61.6 54.0 49.2 51.9 52.6 52.6 51.1 
2nd    industrial  revolution  39.4  38.7 38.7 45.7 51.7 56.4 58.0 61.0 62.9 70.7 
3rd    industrial  revolution  1.0  2.7 4.2 4.6 6.3 8.1 8.8 9.4 9.4 9.1 
Source: G. Federico (2003) the years up 1996 and Istat for 2007. 
Notes: Sectors included in First industrial revolution are: foodstuffs and tobacco, textile, clothing, leather goods, wood 
and furniture, paper and metallurgy. Sectors included in Second industrial revolution are: energy, chemicals, rubber and 
plastics, glass, cement and bricks, basic metals, metallurgy, mechanical instruments, automotives and other 
transportation equipment. Sectors included in Third industrial revolution are: office machinery, electrical devices, radio 
and televisions and precision instruments. Metallurgy is included in both the first and the second revolution since its 




Average firm size, by country and sector, 2008 
(in percentage of the sectoral average of the five countries) 
   DE  ES  FR  IT  UK 
        
Foodstuffs and tobacco  110.6 57.7  38.6  26.8  266.4 
Textiles 169.8 60.6  96.6  67.4  105.6 
Clothing 213.7 73.5  54.9  67.9  90.0 
Leather goods  156.2 68.7  107.3 69.2  98.7 
Wood 142.2 80.1  97.4  52.5  127.8 
Paper 204.5 59.7  114.1 43.4  78.4 
Publishing 197.4 63.7  58.1  61.3  119.7 
Energy 115.8 239.0 89.6  17.2  38.4 
Chemicals   202.2 52.2  108.2 53.6  83.9 
Rubber and plastic  168.8 65.3  131.1 49.7  85.0 
Glass, cement and bricks  141.4 92.6  79.3  51.6  135.2 
Basic metals  170.8 73.8  131.3 57.7  66.4 
Metallurgy 170.6 67.6  108.7 59.3  93.8 
Mechanical instruments  217.9 53.7  80.4  57.4  90.6 
Office machinery  213.5 31.8  89.9  55.0  109.8 
Electrical devices  223.8 83.7  99.2  29.5  63.7 
Radio and televisions  186.5 76.9  132.3 34.0  70.3 
Precision instruments  154.8 51.1  87.3  48.1  158.6 
Automotives 254.5 54.4  88.7  61.7  40.8 
Other transportation 
equipment 218.8 42.2  81.8  39.0  118.2 
Furniture and other 
manufacturing 171.7 78.5  54.7  71.5  123.6 
Total manufacturing  196.8 64.5  75.9  49.5  113.3 





Average number of workers per plant, by sector 
   1911  1927 1937 1951 1961 1971 1981  1991  1996 2007
Foodstuffs  3.9 3.9 2.0 4.6 7.1 7.8 7.6 6.8  5.8 6.0 
Tobacco  341.0  477.8 78.7 70.8 35.9 53.2 87.6 68.8  72.7 139.4
Textiles  51.6 56.9 15.2 16.0 12.8 10.2  7.6  8.8  9.5  8.8 
Clothing  3.5 2.1 1.7 1.9 2.7 4.5 6.1 7.0  7.0 5.8 
Leather  goods  2.4 1.9 1.8 2.2 3.3 6.9 9.6 8.8  9.1 7.7 
Wood  2.7 2.4 2.0 2.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2  3.4 3.9 
Paper  27.8 29.2 28.4 40.7 34.7 31.6 21.3 18.1  16.2 15.6 
Publishing  9.8  8.6 10.0 9.9 11.7  11.1 8.6 7.3 6.2 5.6 
Energy  .  28.4 36.1 81.2 87.1 65.8 42.7 28.9  29.3 27.1 
Chemicals  16.3 18.9  9.7  32.1 48.8 55.7 39.6 33.1  27.6 24.6 
Rubber  and  plastic  15.8 44.9 16.2 17.5 14.8 14.2 12.6 13.5  13.6 13.8 
Glass, cement and bricks  11.6  9.8  10.4  11.7  16.4  14.4  12.3  9.4  8.2  8.0 
Basic  metals  24.2 32.0 38.0 67.4 44.3 43.2 55.3 42.0  33.7 30.7 
Metallurgy  3.3 3.7 7.5 3.9 5.7 7.0 6.2 6.7  6.6 6.8 
Mechanical  instruments 7.4 6.0 6.4 5.5 6.3 6.0 9.6  14.6  12.9 12.1 
Office  machinery  11.4 18.4 25.7  190.1 375.7 451.7 85.7 66.4  31.4 6.9 
Electrical  devices  15.6 16.7 16.3 20.6 21.0 14.1 17.9 12.6  11.9 9.5 
Radios and televisions  7.1  9.7  5.4  9.0  13.9  12.5  19.7  13.2  10.6 10.1 
Precision  instruments  6.9 8.0 4.2  10.6  17.6  15.1  7.3 4.5  4.6 5.8 
Automotives 5.9  9.2  298.6 115.3 210.2 176.7 105.8  92.6  82.2 59.7 
Other transportation 
equipment  10.6  9.8  9.1  13.2 30.7 42.5 42.0 32.8  22.3 16.8 
Furniture and other 
manufacturing  5.1 5.6 4.3 4.1 6.7 7.0 6.1 5.5  5.2 5.6 
Recycled  materials  17.5 6.7  4.5 13.2 5.0      3.8 4.0 5.9 
Manufacturing  5.8 5.7 4.0 5.6 7.5 8.7 9.1 8.8  8.2 8.0 






Employees in plants with more than 500 workers as a share of total number of 
employees. by sector 
(percentages) 
    1911 1927 1937 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 1996 2006
Foodstuffs  -  3.7 11.6 4.8 11.1 11.6 9.3 6.9 6.9 
Tobacco  -  92.0 51.3 51.2 48.6 42.4 34.1 28.2 27.1 
6.5 
Textiles  -  37.3 30.7  40.4 26.2 16.5 7.0 3.2 3.1 
Clothing  -  4.7 2.3 1.9 4.9  11.1 6.7 2.7 3.3 3.2 
Leather  goods  -  1.9 2.1 5.2 3.4 6.5 2.7 1.7 2.6 1.1 
Wood  -  0.1 1.6 1.3 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 
Paper -  23.0 14.3  27.3 20.7 17.0 15.6  10.1  6.6 
Publishing -  4.0  11.6  12.3 10.8 15.4 14.9  7.3  7.4  4.8 
Energy  -  15.8 25.8 53.6 45.8 46.1 43.0 36.2 38.6 32.2
Chemicals  -  22.1 23.0 46.8 50.0 51.4 42.4 30.6 26.8 20.1
Rubber and plastic  -  67.4 38.9  57.7 25.3 29.2 27.3  10.0  7.5  6.8 
Glass.  cement  and  bricks  -  4.6 8.8 7.8 6.8 9.0 8.3 4.2 5.5 3.6 
Basic  metals  -  48.8 37.7 59.4 48.6 50.5 52.5 37.5 33.4 
Metallurgy  -  15.5 22.0  17.7 12.0 10.4 4.8 1.4 1.3 4.8 
Mechanical  instruments  -  18.7 45.3 22.3 15.7 19.1 22.1 16.2 14.6 12.2
Office  machinery  -  45.2 58.4 76.8 90.5 86.7 69.9 61.5 46.2 
Electrical  devices  -  21.7 48.7 42.7 34.0 35.0 25.2 12.9 14.6 
Radios and televisions  -  18.4 35.2  37.5 42.9 47.0 51.4  35.7  35.3 
Precision instruments  -  24.4 29.3  39.0 27.8 23.0 14.9  6.4  8.3 
13.4
Automotives  -  52.1 80.9 75.4 75.7 78.7 74.6 65.2 61.3 
Other transportation 
equipment  -  51.7 60.9  60.7 62.3 56.8 59.9  50.7  45.2 
43.0
Furniture and other 
manufacturing  -  9.0  8.8  4.6  4.8  4.3  1.9  1.2  1.7 
Recycled materials  -  26.0 10.3  n.a.  n.a.  2.3  10.5  -  11.9 
2.0 
                     





Percentage share of employees by firm size and average firm size, by group of sectors 
      1911 1927 1937 1951 1961  1971  1981  1991 1996
                                
 
< 10 




employees    17.9 15.5 18.1 12.4 10.4  5.7  3.1  3.2 
             
   < 10 




employees    24.9 36.1 34.2 28.5 30.4 28.9 19.1 16.3
             
   < 10 




employees    23.3 37.1 42.3 39.4 41.1 32.5 20.3 18.8
                                
Fonte: G. Federico (2003). 
Notes: Sectors included in First industrial revolution are: foodstuffs and tobacco, textile, clothing, leather goods, 
wood and furniture, paper and metallurgy. Sectors included in Second industrial revolution are: energy, chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, glass, cement and bricks, basic metals, metallurgy, mechanical instruments, automotives and 
other transportation equipment. Sectors included in Third industrial revolution are: office machinery, electrical 
devices, radio and televisions and precision instruments. Metallurgy is included in both the first and the second 





Share of employees in units/firms with more than 100 workers 
(percentages) 
        
Country 
Source of 
data Year  Firms  Plants 
        
 Federico  1961  49*  43 
Italy Federico  1991    32 
 Traù  1996    30 
 Eurostat  2001 34  29* 
 Istat  2007 34  29 
   diff 61-01 pp -15  -14 
      diff 61-01 % -31  -32 
        
 Van  Ark  1962 72  61* 
France Van  Ark  1990  60  52* 
 Eurostat  2001 61  52* 
   diff 61-01 pp -11  -9 
      diff 61-01 % -15  -15 
        
 Traù  1962  78*  69 
 Van  Ark  1967 82   
Germany Van  Ark  1990  81  70 
 Eurostat  2001 69  60* 
   diff 61-01 pp -9  -9 
      diff 61-01 % -12  -13 




Size distribution of top 200 firms, by group of 
sectors 
   min median mean  max 
  1st Ind Rev 
1913 52  2209  3224  15000 
1927 81  1191  2300  21212 
1936 51  1092  2581  16279 
1952 24  1192  1964  8009 
1960 190  2200  5561  138300 
1971 543  2672  3215  7986 
1981 674  2151  3126  16137 
1991 264  1464  2112  8504 
2001 358  1200  2057  11772 
  2nd Ind Rev 
1913 41  1400  2688  42222 
1927 21  835  2053  27778 
1936 4  718  2991  36711 
1952 16  1127  2944  39150 
1960 134  1712  4199  92891 
1971 14  1719  5369  182501 
1981 146  1945  4956  119202 
1991 23  1551  3463  102997 
2001 164  1787  3260  41093 
  3rd Ind Rev 
1913 1498  1667  2353  4444 
1927 541  991  1081  1802 
1936 197  757  926  1645 
1952 253  1644  3584  25667 
1960 575  2180  3243  16396 
1971 1743  3801  5784  33142 
1981 1091  3917  5483  21749 
1991 300  2393  3175  14727 
2001 19  2243  2813  17481 
Source: authors’ elaborations on Imita and Mediobanca data 
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Source: authors’ elaboration on Imita.db data (Giannetti and Vasta 2006). 
Notes: Sectors included in First industrial revolution are: foodstuffs and tobacco, textile, clothing, 
leather goods, wood and furniture, paper and metallurgy. Sectors included in Second industrial 
revolution are: energy, chemicals, rubber and plastics, glass, cement and bricks, basic metals, 
metallurgy, mechanical instruments, automotives and other transportation equipment. Sectors included 
in Third industrial revolution are: office machinery, electrical devices, radio and televisions and 
precision instruments. Metallurgy is included in both the first and the second revolution since its 
products evolved with the two different technologies. 
   
 
42Fig. 3 


















Source: authors’ elaboration on Imita.db data (Giannetti and Vasta 2006) and census data (Federico 
2003). 
Notes: Sectors included in First industrial revolution are: foodstuffs and tobacco, textile, clothing, 
leather goods, wood and furniture, paper and metallurgy. Sectors included in Second industrial 
revolution are: energy, chemicals, rubber and plastics, glass, cement and bricks, basic metals, 
metallurgy, mechanical instruments, automotives and other transportation equipment. Sectors included 
in Third industrial revolution are: office machinery, electrical devices, radio and televisions and 
precision instruments. Metallurgy is included in both the first and the second revolution since its 
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